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In just 15 years, Taiwan has emerged as a leading producer of hardware for nearly
every major computer vendor in the world, despite little previous experience in high-
technology industries. By 1995, Taiwan ranked fourth in the world in computer hard-
ware production and exports through its strategy of being a ª fast follower.º  Taiwan’s
success in the computer industry has been due to a coordinated government strategy
to support private entrepreneurship by a large number of small, flexible, innovative
companies. Taiwan’s computer companies have responded rapidly and effectively to
continuing changes in the international market and avoided many of the problems en-
countered by their counterparts in Japan and South Korea in recent years. They have
done so by emphasizing close supplier relationships with multinational computer
companies all over the world as a means of promoting exports and keeping apprised
of market conditions. They continue to show great adaptability as Taiwan’ s computer
industry moves toward diversification both upstream and downstream, full-service
OEM (original equipment manufacturing) for multinationals, and industry consolida-
tion for scale economies. The government has closely complemented the efforts of in-
dustry by carrying out research and development and transferring technology to the
private sector, by conducting market intelligence for private sector use, and by pro-
viding engineering and technical manpower. As a result, Taiwan is probably Asia’ s
best positioned country for continued success in the global computer industry.
Keywords Acer, computer industry original equipment manufacturers (OEM), in-
dustry, structure, Institute for the Information Industry, motherboard, peripheral, per-
sonal computer, Taiwan, Tatung, technology policy
In the past 15 years, Taiwan has emerged as a major player in the international computer
industry. In 1980, Taiwan had no computer production to speak of, and showed little evi-
dence of comparative advantage in high-technology industries such as information tech-
nology. Yet by 1995, Taiwanese companies produced over US$17 billion worth of com-
puter hardware [Market Intelligence Center/Institute for the Information Industry
(MIC/III), 1995], and ranked first or second in the world in production of monitors,
motherboards, notebook computers, keyboards, graphics cards, scanners, and mouse de-
vices (MIC/III, 1995).
Taiwan benefited from entering the computer industry at the time of the personal
computer revolution. The open PC architecture created by IBM in the 1980s lowered bar-
riers for entry into the computer industry, both financially and technologically. Opportu-
nities were created for Taiwanese companies to participate in the decentralized global
production chain of the PC industry. Taiwan’ s computer industry initially reverse-engi-
neered existing technologies to produce low-cost personal computers, peripherals and
components. They subsequently developed their own design and process engineering ca-
pabilities to manufacture more complex, higher value-added products.
The evolution of Taiwan’ s computer industry is quite different from that of its East
Asian neighbors. Japan’ s and Korea’ s computer industries are dominated by a few very
large diversified conglomerates, while Singapore’ s industry consists mostly of sub-
sidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs). Taiwan’ s computer industry consists of
thousands of dynamic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), a few of which have
grown into fairly large firms in recent years (e.g., Acer, First International Computer, and
Mitac).
The growth of Taiwan’ s computer industry cannot be explained as a result of market
forces alone. It is better seen as a result of a coordinated government effort to support the
entrepreneurial efforts of a dynamic private sector. Since the designation of information
technology as a ª strategicº  industry in 1981, a broad range of policy initiatives has been
taken by government to support the computer industry, including incentives to the private
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sector, demand stimulation through government procurement, training of computer pro-
fessionals, support for R&D, and provision of market intelligence.
Taiwan’ s technology policies have been described as ª diffusion oriented,º  with the
ª principal purpose [of] diffus[ing] technological capabilities throughout the industrial
structure, thus facilitating the ongoing and mainly incremental adaptation to changeº
(Ergas, 1986). This focus on flexible adaptation to change is a hallmark of both govern-
ment and company strategy in Taiwan. Taiwan’ s companies take advantage of a highly
flexible, varied, and geographically clustered manufacturing structure to respond rapidly
to market opportunities mainly created by U.S. and Japanese market leadersÐ the ª fast
followerº  strategy. The government has compensated for the liabilities caused by the
small size of companies by providing technology, capital, and market intelligence
geared to the dynamics of the market. Government policies are developed with broad
participation by the public and private sectors and are continuously modified to respond
to changing conditions. The strategy for technology development differs from Japan and
Korea, whose government policies encourage large firms to conduct R&D themselves or
through government±industry consortia. In Taiwan, most firms lack the resources to un-
dertake large R&D projects, so the government has taken a more direct role, creating
public institutions that conduct research and disseminate technology to the private
sector.
In the 1990s, Taiwan’ s computer makers have struggled to adapt to an international
environment marked by brutal price competition, accelerating advances in technology,
and increasing trade friction. So far, they have proven resilient and resourceful, and com-
puter production has continued to grow rapidly, even as the Japanese and Korean com-
puter industries have been badly battered. Taiwan’ s continued success is closely related
to the structure of its computer industry, a structure well suited to the international PC in-
dustry with its complex web of supplier and subcontracting relationships. Taiwan’ s
smaller companies have become tightly integrated into the global production chain of the
PC industry, serving as suppliers and original equipment manufacturers for leading PC
companies all over the world. Their flexible manufacturing systems and strong engineer-
ing capabilities have enabled them to respond quickly to market opportunities in a rapidly
changing industry.
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Figure 1. Framework for analysis.
This article presents a critical analysis of Taiwan’ s experience with computers using
the framework presented in Figure 1. Moving from left to right, it posits that environmen-
tal variables such as the economy and industry structure influence computer production
and use both directly and through the mediation of government technology policy. Envi-
ronment and policy are closely interrelated, as policy choices alter the economy and in-
dustry structure, and these environmental factors in turn shape the range of policy choices
available and the outcome of those choices for computer diffusion. Also, there is a feed-
back from computer diffusion to environment and policy. Over time, the success or fail-
ure of computer diffusion in the economy and of development of a national computer in-
dustry will change the environment and affect ensuing technology policy.
As shown in Figure 1, the environment consists of economic and industry factors
that affect a country’ s ability to produce and use computers, as well as political factors
that affect the policymaking process. Technology policy represents the strategic choices a
nation makes about support for promotion of computer production and use. Computer
diffusion includes the spread of computer use throughout the economy and the develop-
ment of domestic hardware, software, and services industries. The framework is useful
for analyzing both environmental and policy factors, and the interaction of the two, in ex-
plaining the evolution of computer production and use in a country.
The detailed analysis that follows is organized according to this framework. The first
section discusses environmental factors affecting the use and production of computers.
The next section recounts the history of technology policies related to the production and
use of computers, considering the reasons why particular policy choices were made and
the effects of those policies. The ensuing section looks at computer use and production in
Taiwan over time and compares the level of use and production to selected other coun-
tries. Finally, the last section draws conclusions about Taiwan’ s experience with comput-
ers and its prospects for the future.
Environment
Political Environment
Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC), has had a centralized system of government with sta-
ble, one-party rule since the Kuomintang (KMT) Party took power in 1949. The removal
of martial law in 1991 has not reduced political stability and the process of democratiza-
tion has gone smoothly for the most part. If the KMT should be voted out in the future,
the consequences would be uncertain. Taiwan’ s leading opposition party is a pro-inde-
pendence party, and the Peoples’  Republic of China (PRC) has stated its unwillingness
to accept a declaration of independence by the ROC. Taiwan’ s relationship with the
PRC is a key issue economically as well as politically. While the two governments still
do not recognize each other’ s legitimacy, they have gradually opened up economic rela-
tions, and trade and investment have grown rapidly in recent years. China is potentially a
huge market and, as will be seen later, a source of labor and resources for Taiwan. Thus, re-
lations with the PRC will play an important role in determining Taiwan’ s economic future.
Economic Environment
Through the 1950s, Taiwan employed an import substitution strategy of industrialization,
but the domestic market was soon saturated and the economy plagued with inefficient
production and chronic trade deficits. In the early 1960s, Taiwan began opening its econ-
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omy and promoting exports, and launched one of the great success stories in export-led
growth. However, Taiwan’ s success was clearly not a victory of free-market economics,
but one of a government-guided, market-oriented strategy. The government maintained
control over foreign exchange allocation and manipulated the exchange rate to promote
exports. Trade liberalization was rapid for imports of capital goods and intermediate in-
puts, but imports of consumer products were controlled for many years. By the 1970s,
government policy had begun to focus on development of heavy industries such as steel,
petrochemicals, and shipbuilding (Wade, 1990).
In the 1980s, the focus of industry promotion shifted to high-technology industries,
particularly computers and semiconductors. The semiconductor industry was developed
originally by state-owned enterprises spun off from government labs, while the computer
industry was left to the private sector, with support from government. The shift to capital-
and technology-intensive industry is reflected by the composition of Taiwan’ s export
mix, as seen in Table 1. Between 1970 and 1994, labor- and raw-material-intensive ex-
ports (processed food, textiles and wood products) dropped from 52.1% to 20.6%, while
capital- and technology-intensive exports (rubber and plastics, electronics, and metal
manufactures) rose from 15.2% to 42%.
The government drafted a Six-Year National Development Plan for 1991±1996 with
the aim of making Taiwan a major financial center, a regional transportation hub, and a
leader in high technology in the western Pacific. The strategy outlined for achieving these
economic and social objectives called for a substantial increase in government invest-
ment. The heart of the plan was a US$300 billion infrastructure development program
targeting transportation, communications, housing, energy, education, environment, and
technology (Business Week, 1991). This investment was expected to increase domestic
demand and reduce the trade surplus, which had become a source of international friction
with the United States. It was also supposed to cut production costs and improve produc-
tivity by removing infrastructure bottlenecks. However, the high cost of the program con-
cerned bankers and lawmakers, who feared the debt burden would be too heavy. The pro-
gram was cut back in 1993, from NT$8.2 trillion to NT$6.4 trillion,1 and from 779
projects to 634 (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1994).
Industry Structure. Taiwan’ s industrial structure consists of four major groups: small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), large private industry groups, state-owned enterprises
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Processed food
Textiles
Wood products
Rubber and plastics
Electronics
Metal manufactures
3.6%
15.0%
2.0%
6.9%
26.5%
8.6%
1970 1994
Table 1
TaiwanÕs export mix
Note. From Clark (1989) for 1970 and 1986; 1994 data 
approximates Clark’ s categories, constructed from Taiwan Statistical 
Data Book (CEPD, 1995).
1986
12.8%
31.7%
8.6%
1.0%
12.3%
1.9%
5.1%
18.3%
4.4%
9.4%
22.3%
5.9%
(SOEs), and subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations (MNCs). There are
800,000 SMEs in Taiwan, accounting for 96.8% of establishments, 80% of new job cre-
ation, and 50% of total production in Taiwan (MOEA, 1993). In 1986, 65% of manufac-
tured exports were produced by SMEs. In the electronics industry, 4435 new companies
were established in just the period from 1981 to 1986 (Kajiwara, 1993).
The prevalence of SMEs is not simply a factor of market forces. Instead it is a result
of government policy choices. Between 1949 and 1958, tenant farmers were sold land
that had been confiscated from Japanese colonists and bought from landlords under a
land reform program (Clark, 1989). The former landlords were paid in government bonds
and in shares of public companies, which served as a basis for their entry into industry.
Many of the landlords subsequently became entrepreneurs in Taiwan’ s legions of small
and medium-sized companies.
In the past, most SMEs were in labor-intensive industries such as textiles and simple
electronics assembly, but many have been moving into more technology-intensive produc-
tion. This segment of the industrial structure has provided great flexibility and entrepre-
neurial energy, but small firms are often undercapitalized and do not have the resources to
make large investments in plant and equipment or research and development (Clark,
1989). This is especially true in Taiwan’ s electronics and computer industry. Of the 4000
plus firms in the industry, over 85% are registered with less than US$2 million in capital
(Coopers & Lybrand Consultants, 1995). In addition to the predominant SMEs, there are
several large private industry groups, such as Tatung and Formosa Plastics. These are di-
versified industrial conglomerates, but are only a fraction of the size of their counterparts
in Japan and Korea. Some of these groups are now major players in the computer industry.
Certain strategic sectors of the economy have been developed by state-owned enter-
prises. These include heavy industries and semiconductors, which require large invest-
ments to achieve economies of scale and reduce costs. The government decided that such
industries were necessary to support the industrialization process, and were also impor-
tant to national security. As such, it was necessary to develop domestic production,
whether or not the private sector had the means to invest or was willing to take the risk.
As the private sector has grown larger, the government has sold some of its interest in
various SOEs, including several semiconductor companies.
Foreign investment has also played an important role in Taiwan’ s industrialization,
especially in high-technology industries. From 1980 to 1987, foreign investment into Tai-
wan totaled US$4.63 billion. Of the total, US$1.42 billion came from the United States,
US$1.33 billion from Japan, and US$470 million from overseas Chinese (Kajiwara,
1993). Sixteen percent of this total went into the electronics industry. In 1985, the Min-
istry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) found that foreign MNCs accounted for 13% of total
exports, and that the share of foreign companies in total exports was highest in electrical
and electronics machinery at 39%. This figure has declined over time as domestic compa-
nies have displaced MNCs in the electronics industry, but the MNCs have made a critical,
early contribution to the development of Taiwan’ s electronics and computer industries,
both by investing and by sourcing from Taiwanese firms.
Computer Infrastructure
The production and use of computers depends on a supporting infrastructure of telecom-
munications networks, human resources, capital markets, research and development and
complementary industries. Taiwan has a strong infrastructure, particularly in basic
telecommunications services, human resources and complementary industries. It is some-
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what weaker in advanced telecommunications, capital markets, and R&D, but the govern-
ment has been investing heavily and making regulatory reforms to upgrade those areas.
Human Resources. Taiwan has made admirable progress in human resource development,
and now ranks close to the developed countries in many categories, including literacy and
secondary enrollment, as illustrated in Table 2. The pool of scientists and engineers dou-
bled from 1984 to 1991, but is being taxed by the rapid growth of technology intensive
industries. Skilled and semiskilled labor is in very short supply. The Council on Eco-
nomic Planning and Development projects a shortage of roughly 120,000 unskilled and
semiskilled workers by 1996.
Taiwan’ s universities produced 6533 bachelor’ s degrees in natural science and 8950
in engineering in 1990. This total of 15,483 is less than one-third of Korea’ s total, while
Taiwan’ s population is about half of Korea’ s. Taiwan does better in advanced degrees,
with 4011, compared to Korea’ s 7070. Taiwan is behind, proportionally, in the number of
software engineers, as Taiwan’ s total is about 40% of Korea’ s.
Many of Taiwan’ s graduate students study in the United States, where 77% of Tai-
wanese students’  doctoral degrees in natural science and engineering are earned. Many of
them subsequently go to work for large U.S. firms such as AT&T and IBM. Even in
1991, 55% of Taiwanese who earned a doctorate in natural science and engineering in the
United States planned to stay in the United States after graduation (NSF, 1993, p. 45).
This caused a ª brain drainº  of Taiwanese professionals for many years. It is estimated
that there are around 100,000 overseas Chinese working in the United States; 30,000 in
Silicon Valley alone, and that 25% of the semiconductor design engineers in the United
States are Chinese. The government has offered various incentives to induce Taiwanese
nationals to return over the years, and the brain drain has begun to be reversed with con-
siderable advantage for Taiwan. Many engineers and computer scientists have been re-
turning to Taiwan since the mid-1980s for the opportunity to start their own companies or
work for fast-growing Taiwanese firms. They often bring tacit knowledge and high-level
technical and managerial experience from leading-edge U.S. companies when they do re-
turn. A leading example is Morris Chang, who recently retired at 75 from the presidency
of TSMC semiconductor company and is considered the ª fatherº  of Taiwan’ s semicon-
ductor industry. Chang went to the United States for graduate study, stayed there, and
later became a vice-president at Texas Instruments and then president of General Instru-
ments, both early leaders in the U.S. semiconductor industry. While at General Instru-
ments, Chang helped to create about a dozen Taiwanese spin-off companies. He was sub-
sequently invited to become the head of Taiwan’ s leading research institute, where he
spearheaded efforts to develop a local semiconductor industry. Later, when Taiwan Semi-
conductor Manufacturing Company was spun off from the government lab, Chang was
chosen to head the new company. Such examples are exceptional and few, but they have
become part of industry lore, and their impact on the perceptions and motivations of Tai-
wanese scientists and engineers is substantial both at home and abroad.
Even those Taiwanese who remain in the United States are valuable Taiwan re-
sources, providing links to U.S. markets and technology, consulting and moonlighting on
product development, and doing market intelligence for Taiwanese firms and industry.
Research and Development, Technology Transfer. Taiwan has developed its industry
mainly by applying technology transferred from abroad rather than by developing its own
technology. While Taiwan’ s total R&D as a share of GDP was only slightly less than in
Korea, private industry accounted for just 53.6% of R&D expenditures in Taiwan versus
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74% in Korea (Table 3). The small size and low capitalization of most Taiwanese high
technology firms make it difficult for them to do R&D independently. Consequently, the
government has compensated for low levels of private R&D by supporting government-
sponsored institutes, which conduct R&D and transfer technology to the private sector.
Most recently, the government has begun to directly fund private-sector R&D by individ-
ual companies or by industry±research institute partnerships.
Of the NT$95 billion spent on R&D in 1992, about one-fourth was spent on com-
puter-related research (CEPD, 1995). With an emphasis on electronics and computer re-
search, Taiwan has developed a strong technology base in those industries, and has been
very successful in translating those capabilities into commercial products.
Telecommunications. The cost, quality, and penetration of telecommunications and the
availability of advanced services are important to both computer production and use be-
cause they stimulate demand for computer products on the one hand, and support the
computer industry’ s efficient operation on the other. Taiwan ranks ahead of Korea and
Singapore and about even with Hong Kong in penetration of telephone access lines, but is
behind Hong Kong and Singapore in cellular phones (Table 4).
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United States
Japan
Korea
Taiwan
Singapore
China
71.5
76.7
74.0
53.6
54.2
40.0a
R&D as percent
of GDP
Industry as percent
of total R&D
Table 3
R&D expenditures
Note. From PECC (1991), ROC (1993a), and NSF (1993).
a
Includes national enterprises.
2.67 (1991)
2.77 (1991)
1.91 (1990)
1.70 (1991)
0.90 (1990)
0.70 (1990)
United States
Japan
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Singapore
Korea
n.a.
1.5
4.9
2.8
4.7
1.0
Access lines per 100
population, 1991
Cellular phones per
100 population, 1994
Table 4
Telecommunications indicators
Note. From Davidson et al. (1993) and Clifford (1994).
55.3
47.2
47.7
45.5
38.7
38.2
The Directorate General of Telecommunications (DGT) is the sole provider of basic
telecom services. DGT has drafted laws that would split its regulatory and operational
functions, with operations taken over by a newly created company. It would also open up
value-added services to the private sector. However, the new company would still be
government owned, and workers would not give up their civil service status, making cost
reductions difficult. As of 1996, these reforms were still under debate in the legislature,
with at least five different versions being championed by different interests (USDOC,
1994c; interview, DGT, 17 November 1995). The MOTC has opened up some services to
the private sector, including cellular telephone, paging services, and Internet services.
Development of the telecommunications network is a key element of the Six-Year Na-
tional Development Plan of 1991±1996, and DGT has proposed a construction plan of
US$10.5 billion for 1994±1997. However, lack of progress on legislative reform is slow-
ing the reduction of telecommunications costs and the development of advanced telecom-
munications servicesÐ keys to stimulating domestic demand for the computer industry.
Capital. Availability of capital is a small problem for the economy in general, but a big
problem for Taiwan’ s computer industry. Taiwan’ s savings rate averaged about 32% of
GDP in the 1980s, providing a plentiful supply of investment capital. However, domestic
investment declined from 34% in 1980 to just 22% in 1989, reflecting a large outflow of
capital. This may be explained by the relatively low financial returns from the highly
competitive computer industry and by companies shifting production out of Taiwan as
costs of production have increased.
In spite of the seemingly plentiful pool of capital available, Taiwan’ s manufacturers
have a hard time financing investments in plant, equipment, and R&D. As put by one in-
dustry analyst:
Firms have to be big enough or small enough to get capital. If big enough,
they can raise capital in the markets. But, it’ s getting tougher too. In the late
eighties, if a PC company wanted to be listed on the Taiwan stock exchange,
it had to have NT$1 billion in revenues. In 1995, that amount has to be NT$5
billion. Firms need more money today because they not only have to finance
themselves, but their resellers and distributors too. If a firm is small enough,
usually around NT$0.5 billion, it can raise capital from friends and relatives.
The government is encouraging small firms to go to the OTC market to raise
money but there is not much success so far. It will take years to develop that
market. (interview, Moun-Rong Lim, President, Hambrecht and Quist Tai-
wan Co., November 8, 1995).
The scale of the problem is illustrated by the fact that SMEs have been estimated to depend
on informal capital markets (friends and family) for 30±40% of their credit (Baum, 1991).
Some analysts argue that the inefficiencies of the financial markets have been a reason
for the inability of most SMEs to grow into larger companies. They see financial deregula-
tion as the key to improving the functioning of capital markets and providing the necessary
capital to upgrade the manufacturing sector. The banking industry was highly regulated
and dominated by state-controlled banks until recently. In the early 1990s, 15 new banks
were established, mostly backed by corporate conglomerates. The new private banks offer
competition to state-owned banks and provide new sources of capital for industry.
Complementary Industries. An important element of the computer infrastructure is the
presence of complementary industries such as consumer electronics and electronic com-
ponents. Porter (1990) points out numerous examples of the importance of geographically
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concentrated networks of complementary industries, such as California’ s Silicon Valley.
Computer producers can benefit from manufacturing knowledge and technological capa-
bilities that can be transferred from related industries, either within a company or by the
movement of people between companies.
Taiwan has a large and diversified electronics industry that provides a tremendous
supply infrastructure for its computer industry. Total electronics production in 1995 is es-
timated at US$22.6 billion, or about 4% of GDP (Yearbook of World Electronics Data,
1995). Moreover, about 90% of the supply infrastructure is located within the 60-km ge-
ography from Taipei to HsinchuÐ very similar to Silicon Valley. And that infrastructure
is deep, with multiple sources for any upstream product category one might need, as illus-
trated in Table 5.
Taiwan has also been the host to substantial investment by MNCs, and Taiwan’ s elec-
tronics companies have served as suppliers, subcontractors, and original equipment manufac-
turers (OEMs) to multinational electronics companies; more recently, they are also serving
as original design manufacturers (ODMs) for companies like Compaq and Packard-Bell.
Many computer companies in Taiwan started out in the consumer electronics industry,
or were started by engineers from existing companies. The computer industry benefits from
proximity to suppliers of components and from the presence of MNCs, who provide access
to international markets, train local workers, and transfer technology into the country.
Technology Policy
The nature and effectiveness of technology policy are determined to a great extent by the
structure of policymaking institutions. A centralized institutional structure can move
quickly and achieve a high degree of policy coordination. This can be very effective in
responding to economic challenges, as long as information flows are open and decisions
are made in consultation with relevant participants in both the public and private sector.
Policy Institutions
Taiwan’ s institutional structure for economic and technology policy, which is shown in
Figure 2, is highly centralized and has been able to effectively coordinate policy in close
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PC systems
System boards
Keyboards
Power supplies
Printed circuit boards
ICs/ASICs
Cases/housing
1988Product category
Table 5
Downstream assemblers in TaiwanÐ Number of companies
Note. From Coopers & Lybrand Consultants (1995) (based on TEAMA membership directory 
count; a partial listing of all firms in Taiwan).
135
178
77
128
114
25
17
1989
162
177
77
130
140
30
18
1990
201
213
88
151
144
35
22
1991
174
240
98
167
145
39
38
consultation with the private sector. The key institutions are discussed next, with others
briefly described in Table 6.
The president and premier have considerable control over economic policy. The Eco-
nomic and Financial Special Group (EFSG) within the Cabinet serves as the economic
staff for the president, deals with the most difficult economic issues, and has decisive in-
fluence over economic policy (Wade, 1990, p. 196). The EFSG consists of the Minister
of Economic Affairs, Minister of Finance, Director General of the Budget Accounting
and Statistics, Governor of the Central Bank, and one or two ministers without portfolio.
The premier and his cabinet (Executive Yuan) are advised on economic matters by the
Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), whose duties also include for-
mulation of economic plans and arbitration of disputes between ministries.
The leading ministry in charge of economic development and industrial policy is the
Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). Within MOEA, industrial policy is primarily
implemented by the Industrial Development Bureau (IDB). IDB turns the broad plans of
the CEPD and cabinet into detailed sectoral plans. It makes lists of items to receive fis-
cal incentives, encourages firms to buy from domestic suppliers, and provides adminis-
trative guidance to firms in industries targeted for promotion (Wade, 1990). Also, IDB is
in charge of developing industrial parks such as the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial
Park.
MOEA has a major role in technology policy, providing incentives for private sector
R&D, promoting technology imports, and supporting a number of research organizations.
MOEA spent about US$430 million on R&D in 1992 (MOEA, 1992). The Industrial
Technology Research Institute (ITRI) was established in 1973 under MOEA’ s supervi-
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Figure 2. Structure of policy institutions in Taiwan.
sion to conduct research on civilian industrial technologies. In 1993, ITRI had a budget of
over US$500 million (Manasco, 1994), two-thirds from government and one-third from
industry.
One of ITRI’ s branches is the Electronics Research and Service Organization
(ERSO), formed in 1974. ERSO carries out research on semiconductors and computer
hardware technologies, which are commercialized either by state-owned enterprises or
the private sector. Along with conducting its own R&D, ERSO also facilitates technology
transfer by licensing foreign technologies and then sublicensing them to domestic firms.
This eliminates price-raising competition among firms for the same technology and puts
all firms at the same starting point (Wade, 1990).
Three other ITRI subsidiaries conduct computer-related research. The Computer and
Communications Research Laboratories (CCL) researches integration of computer, com-
munication, and consumer electronics technologies. The Opto-Electronic and Systems
Laboratories (OES) conducts R&D on optical disk storage, image processing, and semi-
conductors. The Materials Research Laboratories (MRL) develops materials for electron-
ics and opto-electronic applications (Manasco, 1994). In the past, the approach of ITRI
and its subsidiaries was to develop a prototype of a new technology and transfer it to in-
dustry. That approach is changing because the capabilities of industry are greater. The
new model is to have research institutes and industry work together closely from the be-
ginning of a project (interview, R. Yang, 1993).
The Institute for Information Industries (III), also under MOEA, was formed in 1979
to oversee policy related to software, services, and computer use. III designs and devel-
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The Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) is responsible for telecommunications
policy, and oversees the Communications Research Institute, which is concerned with advanced
telecommunications research.
º
The Science and Technology Advisory Group (STAG) coordinates science and technology policy with
overall economic policy and guides the National Science and Technology Program. The STAG consists
of foreign advisors who meet twice a year to discuss proposals for new technology initiatives in Taiwan
and world developments in R&D.
º
The National Science Council (NSC) recommends national scientific and technology policy and
coordinates R&D activities. NSC supports academic research and training of scientific personnel
(Richeson, 1988). The government also makes heavy use of consultants and task forces, made up of
specialists from universities, research institutes and consulting firms.
º
The Steering Committee for Information Development (SCID) in the Executive Yuan coordinates
government computerization plans. Ministries and agencies develop information plans to support their
own administrative needs and implement them with the assistance of the SCID and III.
º
The Research and Development Evaluation Commission (RDEC) of the Executive Yuan conducts
research on the computer needs of government agencies and coordinates local government computerization
efforts (ROC, 1993b).
º
The Directorate-General of Budget, Accounts and Statistics (DGBAS) administers the budget process,
matching funding to priorities.
º
The Electronic Data Processing Center of DGBAS conducts evaluations and surveys of the computer
needs of government agencies.
º
The Information Development Promotion Subcommittee within the Executive Yuan provides advice on
computer policy and has been responsible for drafting TaiwanÕs national information infrastucture (NII)
plans.
º
Table 6
Other computer policy institutions
Note. These institutions, shown earlier in Figure 2, are also part of the complex institutional structure for 
policymaking and implementation related to economic development and technology policy.
ops systems and networks for government agencies and supports training, technology
transfer, and market intelligence for the computer industry. III also conducts R&D in
software, passing the results to the domestic software industry. Within III, the Market In-
telligence Center (MIC) provides market research for the computer industry. III has a
staff of 1200 people, 80% of which are professionals (III, 1993).
These government institutions frequently consult with industry associations such as
the Taipei Computer Association, Software Industry Development Association, Electron-
ics Industry Development Association, and Computer Industry Development Association,
and with individual firms that are considered industry leaders such as Acer, Tatung, and
MITAC. The aim is to understand industry problems, float plans for industry comment,
promote industry participation in government support programs, evaluate industry pro-
posals for government funding, and monitor firm and industry performance under gov-
ernment grants, loans, and subsidies. For the most part, these relationships with industry
are cooperative and supportive rather than competitive and adversarial, with the result
that most efforts are aimed at achieving positive outcomes even when projects do not go
as expected.
Thus, Taiwan has had a well-defined structure for policy formulation, coordination,
and implementation. Broad economic policy guidance comes from the EFSG and CEPD.
Actual implementation of industrial development and technology policy is centralized
within the MOEA and its affiliates. Frequent consultation occurs at various levels with
international experts, industry associations, and industry leaders in this institutional
structure. This chain of command has been empowered by the political leadership to de-
sign and implement a coordinated policy approach and has enabled Taiwan to develop a
coherent strategy for its computer sector. However, there are some concerns that the gov-
ernment’ s ability to coordinate policy is eroding as democracy takes hold and competing
interests gain influence in the policymaking process. Also, as private companies gain
confidence in their own capabilities, they are becoming less responsive to government
direction.
Technology Promotion
The government has actively promoted the development of high-technology industries in
Taiwan. A key part of that strategy is the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park, opened
in 1980. The park is located close to ITRI laboratories and the government has taken up
to a 49% equity position in spinoffs from ITRI to get ventures off the ground (Wade,
1990, p. 98). Efforts are underway to convert Hsinchu into a ª Science Cityº  modeled on
the Research Triangle in North Carolina and Japan’ s Tsukuba ª Science City.º  An impor-
tant goal for the Science City is to attract overseas Chinese to return to Taiwan and set up
high-tech firms. As of 1989, a third of the firms in the Hsinchu park had been established
by overseas Chinese (Dahlman, 1992). Investors have been wooed by the development of
a fiber-optic telecommunications network, a supercomputing center, and housing and
other amenities (Electronic Business Asia, 1991).
In 1992, Taiwan ran a US$4.7 billion trade deficit with Japan in electronics. The com-
puter industry depends on Japanese suppliers of LCD panels, batteries, and DRAMs, and
U.S. suppliers of microprocessors. Some PC makers accuse Japanese companies of setting
arbitrary limits on supplies of components or raising prices to reduce the profit margin of
Taiwanese companies (Electronic Business Asia, 1992). Still, Taiwan maintains reason-
ably good economic relations with Japan. Japanese companies have transferred trailing-
edge technologies to Taiwanese companies, allowing the Taiwanese to pursue their ª fast-
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followerº  strategy. For instance, when Japanese monitor makers moved up to 17-inch
monitors, they transferred technology for 14- and 15-inch units to Taiwan, allowing the
Taiwanese to take over much of those market segments. Taiwan’ s trade deficit in comput-
ers with Japan has declined recently as Japan has begun importing more components and
peripherals from Taiwan. However, Taiwan remains concerned about its dependence on
Japan for key components such as LCD panels, and for sophisticated production equip-
ment.
One answer has been a concerted effort to develop domestic capabilities in semi-
conductor production. The government  has developed semiconductor technology at
ERSO and supported the entry of domestic firms into the DRAM industry (Table 7).
Taiwan’ s computer industry should benefit from a reliable domestic supply of semicon-
ductors, and the semiconductor industry can also count on a dependable market for its
products. The integration of computers and semiconductors is supported by strong de-
sign capabilities in both industries. This means that domestic companies can benefit
from cooperation in the design of chips, circuit boards, and final systems. A number of
chip factories are already operating or are under construction and as many as 15 are
planned.
Computer Policy
Taiwan’ s national computer policy was spearheaded in the late 1970s by K. T. Li, who was
minister without portfolio but very influential in government and industry, having been
Minister of Economic Affairs, Minister of Finance, a potential candidate for president, and
a close advisor to the then president of Taiwan. Taiwan’ s policy has promoted both produc-
tion and use of computers from the beginning, but has focused primarily on production. In
1980 information industries were designated as ª strategic industriesº  by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, which made them eligible for a host of government subsidies and other
assistance. Plans for advancement of the industry were laid out in the Sectoral Development
Plan for the Information Industry, 1980±1989. The objectives of the Sectoral Development
Plan were to promote the domestic use of computers, to create a market for the local infor-
mation industry, and to develop export-oriented computer production. The promotion of use
was linked to creating demand for local products. According to the director of the Promo-
tion and Services Division of III, ª The computerization of government agencies is basically
a subordinate measure to the government’ s policy for developing the information industry,
aiming to expand the domestic marketº  (Cherng & Lin, 1992).
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A joint venture of Acer and Texas Instruments, using TIÕs technology.º
Mosel-Vitelic, a subsidiary of the U.S. company Vitelic, using technology from the Japanese firm Oki.º
Nanya Plastics, a private firm also using technology from Oki.º
Formosa Plastics, part of a large state-owned petrochemical conglomerate, using technology from Toshiba
and Siemens.
º
Umax, a private company known for making computer scanners, using technology from Mitsubishi.º
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporations (TSMC), owned jointly by the electronics
multinational Philips, the Taiwanese government, and private investors.
º
Vanguard, a new venture supported by US$68 in government investment, is a subsidiary of TSMC
formed when TSMC bought ITRIÕs submicron laboratory in 1995.
º
Table 7
Taiwanese firms in the DRAM industry
Promotion of Computer Production. Government promotion of the computer industry
has taken the form of subsidies, R&D investment, technology diffusion, computer
skills training, trade and foreign investment policies, and alliances with foreign corpo-
rations.
Industry Subsidy. As of 1987, computer companies represented 28% of the total
number of companies receiving assistance under the Strategic Industry Assistance Pro-
gram (Richeson, 1988). This assistance included consultancy and training to managers in
areas such as quality control and assurance and production management, as well as tech-
nical assistance for R&D, automation, and software design. In addition, as of 1987, the
program had provided low-interest loans totaling over US$50 million to computer hard-
ware and software companies (San, 1990).
Research and Development and Technology Diffusion. Government R&D efforts in
computer hardware have been led by ERSO. ERSO’ s task is to develop technology for
the hardware industry, particularly in integrated circuits, and diffuse the technology
through licensing agreements and establishing new spin-off companies. For example, six
semiconductor companies were spun off by ERSO in the 1980s. Other ERSO projects in-
clude the development of prototypes for a superminicomputer system and a RISC-based
engineering workstation, artificial intelligence, and parallel processing. ERSO also devel-
oped a version of the basic input±output system (BIOS) for the IBM-PC that was used by
Taiwanese companies to produce IBM-compatible PCs.
The Computer and Communication Research Laboratory (CCL) took the lead in
helping PC makers get into notebook production. CCL took on much of the commercial-
ization work itself, bringing in as many firms as possible and creating one set of design
and price criteria.
Tax incentives are available to encourage private sector R&D. R&D expenses can be
deducted from taxable income if a firm meets minimum R&D input levels or contributes
to a government fund for collective R&D projects.
Skills Development. Training in computer skills is carried out at multiple levels,
mainly by universities and III, but also by elementary and secondary schools and private
training schools. University education has stressed engineering fields, especially electron-
ics, computer, and software engineering. Graduates of these programs are said to work
well in computer companies, but less well in user industries, because they lack knowl-
edge of business systems. Consequently, the government is promoting establishment of
management information systems (MIS) programs in business schools to meet the need
for business analysts (interview, M. Wang, 1993).
III has focused on special programs for in-service training in electronics and com-
puter skills. One program provides training for entry- and middle-level government per-
sonnel to prepare them to work at government MIS installations. Another program is a 5-
year plan to train at least 1000 government employees annually in end-user computing
courses. Still another program trains teachers at elementary and secondary schools so
they can teach basic computer concepts in the newly provided computer labs at each of
3000 individual schools (Dahlman, 1992).
The government has offered courses in information science for students majoring in
fields other than computer science and has increased the number of university computer
science departments and MIS programs. It has introduced information science to the se-
nior high school curriculum, established at least one computer room for every school, and
subsidized the offering of computer courses at the junior high level. Through a partner-
ship between IBM and III, a Software Engineering Institute was established offering
management and technical courses for executives and professionals (Richeson, 1988).
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Trade and Foreign Investment Policy. While import controls were used in the past to
promote consumer electronics production, the computer industry has been promoted
while maintaining an open import policy. Foreign investments receive the same incen-
tives and privileges as domestic investments. Foreign investors may have 100% equity in
investments in Taiwan and may convert and remit all profits and interest. Until 1990, in-
vestors received a 5-year business income tax holiday, a maximum income tax liability of
20% after the tax holiday, exemption from tariffs on machinery imports, and exemption
from business tax on exports.
Alliance with Multinational Corporations. An important part of Taiwan’ s computer
strategy is the development of alliances with multinational corporations (MNCs) to gain
access to technology and markets. An early example was the Neotech Development Cor-
poration (NDC). NDC was established in 1983 by IBM and III to provide software devel-
opment services to IBM. From 1983 to 1988, IBM paid US$17 million to NDC for appli-
cation software.
Another joint effort between IBM and III is International Integrated System Inc.
(IIS), established in 1988. III provided US$3.5 million and 70 software designers and
IBM provided technical support. Unlike NDC, IIS does not have to provide services for
IBM exclusively. In 1992, IBM and III agreed to merge NDC and IIS into a single com-
pany called Integrated Systems Development Corp. (ISDC), owned by IBM, III, and the
ISDC employees. It is hoped that ISDC will have the size and technical ability to com-
pete in the international market (Hou & San, 1993).
The software industry lacks marketing and distribution channels abroad and has lim-
ited experience in developing packaged software that can be exported. Consequently, it
must work with multinationals to develop products for export. III has signed agreements
with U.S. computer firms to commercialize some of its large-scale projects in the Asia
market. These include a Chinese input±output system licensed to IBM and a joint venture
with Hewlett-Packard to develop software for the Asian market (Wade, 1990). III also
works with Microsoft developing Chinese-language applications for MS/DOS and con-
verting English programs into Chinese (Electronic Business Asia, 1991). Microsoft devel-
oped the Chinese version of Windows 3.0 in Taiwan, but moved its development of Win-
dows 95 to the mainland after pressure from the PRC government.
Provision of Market Information. The Market Intelligence Centre (MIC) of III is the
key agency responsible for gathering and distributing market information to the computer
industry. The MIC makes quarterly forecasts, produces monthly market reports, holds fre-
quent industry seminars, and cooperates with industry associations to identify and satisfy
market intelligence needs. MIC provides more specialized information than the large mar-
ket research firms such as International Data Corporation (IDC) and Dataquest. As put by
one MIC analyst, ª IDC and Dataquest usually report market information about the top nine
companies and then `all others.’  We focus on the `all others.’  Also, we focus on specific in-
dustry segments like monitors or motherboards and on the short- to mid-term (1±2 years)
rather than the long term. We respond to questions that industry needs answers to now.º
Taiwan’ s SMEs lack the expertise and money to collect or buy on their own the market
intelligence provided by MIC. Thus, MIC plays a critical role in collating information de-
veloped by other industry watchers, collecting its own information, supplying information
at reduced costs (about US$5,000 per year vs. US$40,000 per year in the U.S. from private
industry watchers), and supporting the export activities of Taiwan’ s computer industry.
Software Industry Promotion. Since the early 1990s, computer policy in Taiwan has been
shifting more toward the software and services industries, which are the fastest growing
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segments of the computer industry, and where Taiwan is still relatively weak compared to
hardware production. In 1989, III started the Software Engineering Environment Devel-
opment (SEED) project, which lasted until 1992. The goal of the SEED project was to
create a distributed software development environment and provide an information net-
work where information, tools, and standards for software development would be avail-
able to developers throughout the country.
In 1992, the Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) and III were given responsibility
to develop a 5-year plan for the software industry with a target of reaching US$3.5 billion
in output by 1997, with 20% of that total coming from exports (Kumar, 1993). The plan
targets development of Chinese-language software for the domestic and export markets,
selective development of packaged software products, and promotion of the systems inte-
gration business. The government’ s role in promoting the industry includes (III, 1992; in-
terview, Sam Shen, 1995):
· Making competitive awards under an R&D grant and loan program for software
development projects with potential for export. About 15 awards averaging NT$3
million had been made by the end of 1995.
· Using domestic large-scale system projects to help local companies to develop sys-
tems integration capability.
· Introducing key technologies and helping local companies develop technology. In-
cluded here are projects to develop object-oriented technology, integrated CASE
tools, and a software modification and validation center to develop quality assur-
ance models.
· Training software personnel and cultivating the talents of advanced technology
and program managers.
· Providing facilities for software development and accelerating development of
computerization standards. Chief among the facilities is the creation of software
parks in Taipei, Taichung, and Tainan.
Through these efforts the government hopes to increase the productivity of software
professionals by providing them with necessary tools and standards. It also hopes to in-
crease the average size of software and systems integration firms to enlarge their opera-
tional scale and strengthen their corporate structure. And it hopes to increase the amount
of software that is exported to other countries. Experience with the program thus far indi-
cates that a critical unanticipated need is the development of business knowledge and
skills among software engineers, including general management and packaging, distribu-
tion, and marketing for export.
Nankang Software Park. The first software park being built is the Nankang Software
Park in the new Economic and Trade Park being developed by the City of Taipei and the
MOEA. The goal of the park is to provide a low-cost, supportive environment for export-
oriented software companies. The initial target markets will be China, Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore, and the Chinese communities in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and elsewhere.
The park provides an integrated infrastructure for software development, testing, pack-
aging, and distribution. There are also shared resources such as hardware, systems engineer-
ing tools, software validation services, distribution channels, legal services, and international
marketing facilities. Its infrastructure includes a fiber optic network, emergency power, and
power cogeneration. The full services of III will be relocated to the park, with the exception
of top staff (interviews, C. N. Liu, 1993, 1995). MNCs are invited into the park to engage in
joint ventures or to offer specific technologies. It is hoped that domestic companies will form
alliances with MNCs and develop Chinese-language versions of their software.
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Small Business Software Development. The Small and Medium Enterprises Bureau
of MOEA is subsidizing software development for 40 types of small businesses (defined
as having less than 70 employees and less than US$200,000 in capital) ranging from
laundries to bicycle shops to karaoke bars. The idea is to develop the local market for
software, to test products in that market, and eventually to export the software products to
Chinese communities in other countries. The market in Taiwan is viewed as too small to
support the software industry, but it can serve as an important base for developing soft-
ware for export. One problem for the industry has been the government’ s policy of devel-
oping software itself and giving it away to businesses to encourage them to use comput-
ers, thereby limiting the local market for commercial software. This is avoided in the
small business software project by contracting with commercial software firms to de-
velop the packages.
The Science and Technology Advisory Group has proposed putting up NT$7 billion
to support the software industry. III developed a plan under which most of the money
would go to III, which the industry views as self-serving. The Software Industry Devel-
opment Association says the money should go to efforts such as improving retail chan-
nels, providing better microlevel market intelligence on the software market, providing
patient venture capital, and developing strategic alliances with foreign companies (inter-
view, A. T. S. Hwa, 1993).
Promoting Computer Use
In the past, computer use has not received as much government attention as production.
This is changing now, as there is an increasing awareness of the importance of applica-
tion of computers to other industry sectors to improve productivity and maintain competi-
tiveness. The government is attempting to promote computerization in both the private
and public sector. Promotion of computer use and development of the domestic software
industry are seen as closely linked. Encouraging domestic computer use will provide a
market for the software industry, and developing locally oriented Chinese-language soft-
ware will encourage computer use.
In 1990, the MOEA appointed the ROC Software Association to implement a Five-
Year Industrial Computerization Promotion Plan. A team was organized to help 480 man-
ufacturers to prepare information systems (IS) plans and to provide consulting services
for other firms already in the process of computerizing (Wang, 1994). In 1991, the Small
and Medium Enterprises Bureau of MOEA appointed information systems (IS) experts to
conduct diagnoses of IS needs at 196 small firms and provide consulting to those asking
for assistance. The government offers a 50% subsidy for expenses under US$6,000 and
makes low-interest loans available for small firms to buy hardware and software (Wang,
1994). In addition, the government’ s plans to develop vertical applications for small busi-
ness sectors should make it easier for small businesses to computerize by avoiding the
costs of creating custom applications.
Computer Use in Government. Government historically has been the largest user of com-
puters in Taiwan (see Figure 5). Computer procurement policy goals are quite different
for hardware and software. For hardware, procurement policies are aimed at getting the
best performance at the lowest price and there is no explicit policy to buy local products.
However, when it comes to PCs one local observer said, ª It is easier to sell ice to an Es-
kimo than to sell a foreign PC in Taiwan. About 90% of the PCs used in Taiwan are
made in Taiwanº  (interview, 1995). For software procurement, since 1986 there have
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been explicit ª buy localº  policies to promote the local software industry (Cherng & Lin,
1992).
In 1983, the government developed a plan for the creation of a Nationwide Adminis-
trative Information Functional System. In 1993, the government released a White Paper
on Government Computerisation prepared by a task force in the Steering Committee for
Information Development of the Executive Yuan (ROC, 1993b). The White Paper recom-
mended expanding government computer use through the development of strategic na-
tional information systems projects. Six strategic national information projects are under
development, with spending projected at US$1 billion over 5 years. They are the House-
hold Registry and Conscription Administration Information System, Land-Use Informa-
tion Management System, National Geographic Information System, Cargo Clearance
Automation Plan, Medical/Health Care Information System, and National Health Insur-
ance Information System.
Management of government information systems projects and development of soft-
ware for those projects have been led by III and the relevant agencies. III takes on most
major government software development jobs itself, rather than directing them to the pri-
vate sector. This is partly because the government agencies feel more confident working
with III than with private software houses, who may lack the financial resources, skills,
or experience to carry a job to completion.
Policy Issue: The Role of Government and Industry
In spite of their impressive track records, the key computer policy institutions in Taiwan
have increasingly come under attack for taking too large a role in the development of new
technologies and for competing with the private sector (Manasco, 1994). Industry execu-
tives and legislators have complained that institutions like ITRI receive too much of Tai-
wan’ s R&D money and that ITRI’ s efforts benefit big companies disproportionately. Oth-
ers say the ITRI’ s researchers do not understand the market and are not aggressive
enough in commercializing their work. Still others complain that ITRI goes too far in
commercializing its research and that it should bring in private investors at earlier stages
of development.
ITRI was criticized for allowing over 40 companies into a consortium to set note-
book computer standards and develop prototypes. This led to price wars and most mem-
bers of the consortium dropping out of the notebook market. ITRI Chairman Morris
Chang even admitted the mistake. ª It was done to raise the technology level of more
companies, but without regard to the economic dynamicsº  (Manasco, 1994). Some indus-
try leaders, such as Acer CEO Stan Shih, have acknowledged ITRI’ s importance in the
past, but now argue for its breakup and privatization. However, there are fears that it
would be a mistake to break up the leading independent research facility in Taiwan.
So far, the government has gone as far as reducing ITRI’ s budget slightly for 1994
after nearly doubling it between 1989 and 1993. This forces ITRI to look more to indus-
try, which now provides one-third of its funding. ITRI has responded to the criticism by
announcing it would shift its emphasis more to precompetitive research and by establish-
ing nine industry advisory committees to better understand the needs of industry.
Similar complaints have been heard about III. Because of its size, experience, and
ª deep pockets,º  III gets a large share of government software development contracts.
This is resented by the private software houses, who are in competition with III for pro-
jects and must live within project budgets. There are some who feel III should subcon-
tract more of its work to the private sector, and there is even discussion about dividing III
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up into several software companies. III officials do not want to see such a spin-off as they
consider themselves part of the government. III has begun to change its role by concen-
trating more on project planning and management while giving more opportunities to the
private sector. In the past, III has run into problems with subcontracting, as private-sector
companies were unable to complete jobs and III had to take over. However, as Taiwan’ s
software companies mature and gain capabilities, III is expected to evolve toward a staff
and policy function rather than an operational role.
The role of government in technology policy is in transition. While Taiwanese offi-
cials are satisfied with past efforts to improve Taiwan’ s technological capabilities, they
now want private industry to do more R&D. A key target of the Ten-Year Science and
Technology Plan (1986±1995) was to increase the private sector’ s share of R&D from
40% to 60% of total spending (Hou & San, 1993). The actual private sector share of
R&D was 48% for 1992, the latest reported date (CEPD, 1995). One approach is to spin
off commercial enterprises from ITRI as has been done in the semiconductor industry.
Future Computer Policy: National Information Infrastructure
In 1994, Premier Lien Chan announced the establishment of a national information infra-
structure (NII) task force to coordinate Taiwan’ s NII development efforts (USDOC,
1994c). The task force is charged with implementing telecommunications privatization,
supporting R&D, improving wireless communications, and establishing standards for net-
work-to-network compatibility. Taiwan is following the lead of Singapore, the United
States, and others in developing NII plans with the goal of improving productivity in
manufacturing, commerce, government, and education, and eventually to providing new
information services to households.
Taiwan’ s NII plans go beyond infrastructure development, however. Construction of
the NII is expected to expand demand for the computer hardware industry and to help de-
velop the software and telecommunications equipment industries (USDOC, 1994c). The
notion of building infrastructure and encouraging use in order to promote domestic pro-
duction is a continuing theme of Taiwanese computer policy. By linking production, use,
infrastructure, and R&D, the Taiwanese government is hoping to solidify Taiwan’ s posi-
tion as a world leader in the electronics and information industries.
Computer Sector
Production
Electronics production in Taiwan was started by Japanese and American multinationals
who set up assembly operations in the 1960s to take advantage of Taiwan’ s low-cost
labor and facilities. Many of Taiwan’ s electronics manufacturers were started as spin-offs
of these multinationals, while other companies sprung up to supply components. Many
local entrepreneurs acquired management and technical skills working for, or selling to,
MNCs. The first entrants into the computer industry were companies making unautho-
rized clones of the Apple II computer in the late 1970s. By the early 1980s, many Tai-
wanese electronics companies had shifted out of consumer electronics and were produc-
ing PC hardware. Some made components and peripherals such as cables, power
supplies, keyboards and monitors, while others moved into PC assembly. As they gained
experience and manufacturing capabilities, they shifted into more complex products such
as motherboards, graphics cards, scanners, and eventually notebook computers. These
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companies tended to move into new designs of existing products or new product lines al-
together in response to new profit opportunities (Levy & Kuo, 1991). Most successful do-
mestic producers started very small and grew rapidly. Those that failed in one product
line often regrouped and tried again. With low upfront investments in production facili-
ties, the cost of failing was low, and an entrepreneur could start over with another small
investment.
Production by foreign MNCs played an important role in the early development of
Taiwan’ s PC industry, but domestic companies surpassed foreign subsidiaries in PC pro-
duction by 1990. More important in the long run was MNC sourcing of components and
contracting with local firms for original equipment manufacturing. By 1995, Taiwan
ranked fourth in the world in computer production and computer exports (Yearbook of
World Electronics Data, 1995). Figure 3 shows the phenomenal growth of hardware pro-
duction from 1985 to 1995.
In 1994, Taiwanese companies ranked first in the world in production of monitors
(56% of world market), motherboards (80%), switching power supplies (31%), image
scanners (61%), mice (80%), and keyboards (52%). They ranked second in notebook
computers (28%) and produced 8% of the world’ s desktop PCs (Table 8). While pro-
duction has grown rapidly in each of these categories, labor-intensive products are in-
creasingly being manufactured offshore in China and Southeast Asia. These products
include monitors, motherboards, power supplies, graphics cards, mice, and keyboards
(Table 8).
Ninety-three percent of all Taiwanese hardware production is exported (USDOC,
1994b). There is heavy dependence on original equipment manufacturing, which actually
increased from 31% of total PC output in 1991 to 46% in 1992. In 1991, 49% of Tai-
wan’ s exports of PCs and monitors were of self-owned brands, 46% were exported on an
OEM basis to multinational corporations, and the remaining 5% were sales by foreign-
owned firms producing in Taiwan. This illustrates the degree to which Taiwan relies on
links to multinational corporations (51% of exports were by or through MNCs), but also
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Figure 3. Computer hardware production in Taiwan, 1985±1995. (Yearbook of World Electronics
Data, 1992, 1995; MIC/III, 1995).
the degree to which domestic companies are involved (95% of exports were produced by
domestic companies).
Taiwan’ s role in original equipment manufacturing (OEM) production is so great that
one analyst dubbed it the ª Krups of the computer warsº Ð a reference to the German arms
maker who supplied all the combatants in World War I. Taiwan does a large volume of
OEM production for major PC brands such as Apple, Compaq, Dell, IBM, and Packard-
Bell, averaging around $400 million annually with each of these majors (Table 9).
In addition, Taiwan is OEM supplier to the global PC industry, including the leading
computer companies in Europe and Japan as well as the United States (Table 10). And, as
both of these tables indicate, OEM production is spread across a large number of prod-
ucts and firms, illustrating the breadth and depth of Taiwan’ s PC industry.
Taiwan’ s companies have to be agile to keep up with the rapidly changing techno-
logical and market environment. They were hit hard by the PC price wars of the
1990s, and remain precariously dependent on foreign sources of components and tech-
nology. Meanwhile, the appreciation of the NT dollar, combined with wage increases
of 15±20% a year in 1989±1990, hurt Taiwan’ s price competitiveness across the
board. Taiwan’ s computer industry had competed on the basis of low prices, and saw
profits squeezed as costs increased and competitors lowered their prices (Electronic
Business Asia, 1991). Many of the smaller producers were driven out of the PC market
altogether.
However, Taiwan is nothing if not flexible, and its computer makers adapted to these
challenges in several ways. Taiwan’ s companies have improved their engineering capa-
bilities, allowing them to upgrade their products by designing new features into PCs and
components. It is claimed that in Taiwan, the time required to take an engineering con-
cept to volume production is the shortest in the world, at 90 days (Clifford, 1993). Tai-
wanese manufacturers are also said to operate with overhead costs of less than 10% of
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Monitor
Portable PC
Desktop PC
Motherboard
Scanner
Power supply
Graphics card
Terminal
Network card
Mouse
Keyboard
Audio card
Hub
Video card
24,028
2,057
3,090
17,545
1,663
25,960
8,770
1,060
6,120
29,800
22,800
1,986
310
472
Table 8
TaiwanÕs world market share and output of hardware products, 1994
Note. From MIC/III (1995).
a Share of merchant market, which does not include production for internal use.
14,391
2,057
3,090
11,529
1,663
12,150
5,040
1,060
6,100
22,052
7,068
1,986
310
472
8
59
35
26
75
6
Ð1
Ð24
60
12
17
331
95
88
56
28
8
80a
61
31
32
22
34
80
52
11
18
24
Total production,
including
offshore
(1000s of units)
Domestic
production
(1000s of units)
Growth rate,
1993Ð1994
(%)
Share of
world
market
(%)
40
0
0
34
0
53
43
0
0.3
26
69
0
0
0
Production
offshore
(%)Product
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Apple
Compaq
Dell
IBM
Packard-Bell
Table 9
Taiwan OEM production for major PC vendors
Note. From MIC/III (1995).
Monitor
Notebook
PDA
SPS
Monitor
Mouse
Notebook
PCB
SPS
Monitor
Notebook
Motherboard
PCB
SPS
Monitor
Motherboard
SPS
Notebook
PC
Motherboard
Keyboard
OEM productBuyer
Tatung
Acer
Inventa
Delta
ADI, Philips, TECO
Logitec, Primax
Inventa
Compeq
Lite-on, Delta
Lite-on, Royal
Inventa
GVC, Lung Hwa, FIC
Compeq
Lite-on
Sampo, Capertronic
GVC, Elite, Lung Hwa
Sun-Moon-Star, Delta
ASE
Tatung
Tatung, GVC
BTC
Taiwan maker
$300Ð400
$400
$450
$400
$450
1994 OEM
expend.
(US$millions)
$300Ð400
$500
$450
$450
$500
1995 OEM
expend.
(US$millions est.)
AST
DEC
Gateway 2000
Sharp
NEC
Matsushita
Table 10
Taiwan OEM production for PC vendors worldwide
Note. From MIC/III (1995).
Notebook
Monitor
PC
Alpha PC
Monitor
Notebook
Organizer
Monitor
Motherboard
(98 series)
Monitor
OEM productBuyer
Quanta
Compal
Philips Taiwan
Lite-on
DEC  Taiwan
Elite
Mag
Twinhead
Cal-comp
Tatung
Elite
Panasonic,
Taiwan
Taiwan maker
Hitachi
Epson
Philips
Siemens
Vobis
NCR
Buyer
Monitor
PC
Notebook
Notebook
Monitor
Monitor
Notebook
Notebook
Monitor
Monitor
OEM product
Acer
Unitron
Arima, Compal
Kapok
Philips Taiwan
Kapok
Quanta
Clevo
Royal
Acer, TVM
Taiwan maker
sales, compared to 25±30% for foreign competitors, partly due to the excellent supply in-
frastructure and the limited levels of R&D and marketing carried out by Taiwanese firms.
The latter provides an advantage in price competition, but is also evidence of dependence
on foreign distribution channels and OEM production.
Taiwanese companies have moved into new market niches such as notebook comput-
ers while they are still highly profitable. To overcome the problems of labor shortages
and increasing wages, firms are moving to automation and advanced production tech-
niques such as surface-mount technology (SMT). Firms are also moving production of
labor-intensive products offshore. The differential in labor costs is a factor of 10 between
Taiwan and the mainland, and the mainland has a large supply of engineers and computer
programmers (Table 2). The movement offshore is illustrated in Table 11. Offshore pro-
duction was 24% of total production in 1995 and is expected to be 33% by 1997. This
movement offshore, which is occurring among all Asian computer makers, is primarily in
response to rising labor and facilities costs at home and increased price competition for
personal computers in world markets.
Taiwan’ s computer makers continue to look for new ways to compete. Three trends
appear particularly important: diversification, full-service OEM, and consolidation. Tai-
wanese firms are diversifying in both products and markets. Acer makes DRAMs in a
joint venture with Texas Instruments, motherboard leader FIC is making notebooks,
Elitegroup is focusing on scanners and semiconductors (in a venture with Mitsubishi),
while scanner maker Umax has just licensed the Macintosh operating system to enter the
Mac clone market. Other companies are expanding into new markets. Most notably, Acer
has developed a worldwide marketing network (ranking number 1 in Mexico, for in-
stance), and plans to list 21 subsidiaries on local stock markets by the end of the century
(its ª 21 in 21º  plan). Taiwan is also diversifying its OEM and components business as a
number of major Japanese companies have begun to source in Taiwan or develop OEM
relationships with Taiwanese companies. Fujitsu established an international procurement
office in Taiwan in 1995 and plans to procure US$2 billion worth of hardware through
1998. Epson, NEC, Sharp, and Hitachi are all involved in OEM relationship with Tai-
wanese companies. In fact, while Acer has pushed its own brand name, other companies
such as Mitac have refocused on OEM production (Kraemer & Dedrick, 1996).
Taiwanese firms are also moving toward full-service OEM and ODM (original de-
sign manufacturing). OEM production used to involve a U.S. company coming to a Tai-
wanese company with a new design and contracting for production. Taiwan’ s OEM lead-
ers, such as FIC, Mitac, Acer, and others, have now expanded their capabilities to include
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Total production
Domestic
Offshore
Offshore as percent
of total
14,582
11,579
3,003
21
1992Hardware production 1994
17,418
13,139
4,279
24
1995
20,553
14,584
5,969
29
1996
23,924
16,043
7,881
33
1997
Table 11
Domestic and offshore computer production (US$ millions)
Note. From MIC/III (1995).
1993
8,391
7,418
973
12
9,693
8,002
1,691
17
design, distribution, and service. Now a U.S. (or Japanese) company comes to Taiwan
and is presented with a catalog of motherboard designs, and chooses the one that meets
its system configuration requirements. If the Taiwanese company is producing the entire
system, it may also distribute the finished product to the U.S. company’ s resellers and
even provide warehousing, logistical and service support. The U.S. company might never
actually take possession of the computer. Its only functions are marketing, channel sup-
port, and finance. This new arrangement puts a premium on set-up capabilities that go far
beyond low-cost manufacturing. They include market intelligence, product design, logis-
tics, and customer support. By developing these capabilities, the Taiwanese companies
have increased their share of the value chain in the PC industry and created competitive
advantage against competitors in other countries. Finally, Taiwan’ s companies have im-
proved their quality and no longer have the reputation for the poor quality they had in the
1980s.
A very recent trend in Taiwan’ s computer industry has been an increasing concen-
tration of production by larger companies. Taiwan’ s computer industry was built around
nimble small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which could get to the market
faster than the giants that dominated the industry in Japan and Korea. The PC industry
has evolved to a point, however, where economies of scale are critical to success. Only
large producers can get volume discounts on components, or offer the scale of produc-
tion necessary to handle major OEM accounts. The same situation is true in components
and peripherals such as motherboards and monitors. The result is that the industry is
consolidating, with the top five producers accounting for the large majority of most
product categories (Table 12). Some of the SMEs have grown into relatively large com-
panies and have come to dominate certain market segments. For instance, over 70% of
Taiwan’ s monitor production is accounted for by the 10 largest producers. Some of the
larger companies, such as Acer, Mitac, and Tatung, have begun to achieve global brand
name recognition. By 1995, Acer was the 8th largest selling brand of PCs in the U.S.
market.
However, as shown in Table 12, the list of the top five includes different companies in
most categories, with only a few companies such as Acer among the leaders in multiple
product lines. So consolidation still does not involve industry domination by a few giant
diversified firms, as is the case in Japan and Korea. The role of Taiwan’ s smaller compa-
nies is limited mostly to supplying components such as resistors, capacitors, screws, etc.
This is still a critical role, however, as computer makers in Taiwan can literally order all
the parts they need to develop a new design and have them delivered the same day. The
companies hurt most by the consolidation are medium-sized firms that lack the size to
compete in volume markets, but are too big to survive on small, irregular orders.
Still, the increased concentration is not turning Taiwan into another Japan or Korea.
Even Acer and Mitac are still small companies compared to Hitachi, NEC, Samsung or
Goldstar. And unlike the Japanese and Korean conglomerates, the Taiwanese firms
mostly remain focused on the computer industry. It is not surprising that some industry
concentration should occur as its industry matures. However, there is still a great deal of
entrepreneurial energy in those companies and in start-ups trying to exploit new market
opportunities.
Software and Services. Taiwan’ s software and information services industries are far be-
hind the hardware industry in size and capabilities. Local production of packaged soft-
ware was estimated at US$166 million in 1993 and US$215 million in 1994. Exports to-
taled about US$45 million in 1993 and US$56 million in 1994. Domestic companies also
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provided US$182 million in systems integration services in 1993 and US$207 million in
1994 (USDOC, 1994a).
There are about 125 packaged software companies in Taiwan, employing 5600
people. Most are involved in PC applications, including Chinese system software and
font generators, desktop publishing, word processing, and vertical applications for spe-
cific industries. The prevalence of pirated software hampers the development of a
packaged software industry for the domestic market. Illegal copies accounted for 84%
of PC software packages sold in Taiwan in 1993 according to the Business Software
Alliance (1993).
In the past, growth in the software and services industry has been limited by a small
domestic market, lack of intellectual property protection, and difficulties in raising capi-
tal. The tendency of government agencies to depend on III for their software and systems
integrations needs is another problem. Development of large government networks and
the NII is expected to create rapid growth for the software and systems integration indus-
tries, and III has pledged to contract more development to the private sector. The govern-
ment has also been more serious about cracking down on software piracy since the
United States threatened to invoke trade sanctions over the issue, and since Taiwan’ s own
software industry has pushed for stronger enforcement.
Computer Use
Taiwan’ s installed base of computers and computing power is about twice the level of
Korea, but lags well behind Singapore and Hong Kong. Investment in computer products
and services in Taiwan was the lowest of any of the East Asian NICs in 1992, measured
by computer spending as a percent of GDP (Table 13). Taiwan’ s spending increased at a
rate second only to Korea among the NICs from 1983 to 1992.
Figure 4 shows the Taiwan computer market by product category. The relatively low
levels of spending on software and services reflect the often-stated claim that Taiwanese
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Japan
Singapore
Hong Kong
Korea
Taiwan
97
125
101
37
74
Investment
in computersa as
percent of GDP,
1992
Number of
computers
per 1000
people
199
241
159
70
150
MIPSb per
1000
people
Table 13
Computer use in Asia-Pacific countries
Note. From CRITO Database; Juliussen and Juliussen (1994).
aHardware, software, and services.
bMillions of instructions per second, a measure of computing power.
Average annual
growth rate (%),
1983Ð1992Country
1.99
1.42
0.84
0.87
0.77
11.85
17.01
12.85
22.63
19.51
Installed baseInvestment
business people are unwilling to spend money on services and expect software to be bun-
dled with hardware.
Figure 5 shows that the public sector has led the way as the largest user. This is
partly the result of Taiwan’ s strategy of government paving the way for computer indus-
try growth by creating demand. It is also because most small Taiwanese companies have
lacked the resources for investment in computerization and have not appreciated the
value of computers as a business tool. In recent years, computer investment by the private
sector has grown rapidly as the cost of computers dropped and as user companies grew
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Figure 4. Taiwan computer market by product category, 1983±1994 (CRITO Database).
Figure 5. Taiwan computer market by user sector, 1985±1993 (CRITO Database).
larger and gained technological sophistication. The home market is also growing rapidly,
accounting for over 10% of total sales.
Conclusions
The two-way relationship between environment and policy, posited in our conceptual
framework, is clearly illustrated in the foregoing history of Taiwan’ s computer industry.
The Taiwan government helped create a decentralized industry structure throughout the
economy by its policies in the 1950s and 1960s. When it began promoting the computer
industry in the 1980s, it had an industry structure in place that was well suited to the de-
centralized structure of the international PC industry. The government took advantage of
the strengths of that structure and designed policies that would help compensate for its
weaknesses. The combination of a favorable industry structure and effective government
policies helped Taiwan become the fourth largest producer and exporter of computer
hardware in the world by 1994.
Taiwan’ s success might best be considered in contrast with other countries in the
Asia-Pacific region. In contrast to Korea, Taiwan has been able to weather and adapt to
the brutal market pressures of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Korea’ s computer produc-
tion and exports declined dramatically in the early 1990s and Korea’ s PC industry has
failed to move beyond simple assembly of PCs and production of monitors (Dedrick et
al., 1996). Even Japan’ s giant computer manufacturers have seen their revenues and prof-
its hit hard by price competition and the shift in demand from mainframes to PCs. Singa-
pore is a major export platform for MNCs, but has limited involvement by domestic firms
(Gurbaxani et al., 1991). Hong Kong’ s computer industry has shifted much of its labor-
intensive production to China, and has generally failed to develop its technological capa-
bilities (Kraemer et al., 1994).
How is it that Taiwan’ s computer industry has been able to continue to grow and up-
grade its technological capabilities while others have floundered? An adequate explana-
tion must include both environmental and policy factors. In particular, we focus on indus-
try structure and entrepreneurship on the one hand, and a coordinated, pragmatic
approach to computer policy on the other.
Industry Structure and Entrepreneurship
Taiwan’ s industry structure is well suited to the international personal computer industry.
The open architecture created by IBM in the PC industry lowered financial and technolog-
ical barriers to entry and created a market for standardized components and peripherals. In
the earlier mainframe computer era, smaller companies were largely shut out of the market
by IBM’ s market dominance and its strategy of producing a large share of components and
peripherals in-house. The PC revolution created a new horizontally segmented industry
structure, with opportunities for many companies to compete in fast-growing market
niches throughout the production chain. A company could build a better or cheaper com-
ponent, based on openly available technical standards, and find a buyer for it.
These conditions fit well with Taiwan’ s computer industry. The many SMEs in the
computer industry are supported by a deep and wide supply infrastructure that extends
from basic parts and components in the plastics, metal working, chemicals, and electronic
industries to subassemblies in the PC industry. These basic industries, plus the subassem-
blers of system boards, keyboards, monitors, power supplies, printed circuit boards, inte-
grated circuits, and cases/housing in the PC industry, are located in a 60-km geography
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from Taipei to Hsinchu that provides close cooperation between suppliers and manufac-
turers, personal networking between engineering and technical staff, natural just-in-time
(JIT) or near-JIT delivery cycles, ample second sources in the event of supply problems,
and immediate engineering and technical support. No order is too small or insignificant
for Taiwanese companies, who take business that larger competitors ignore and provide
the fastest turnaround in the industry. Over time, they have been able to produce more so-
phisticated products and on a larger scale, but their strength has remained in flexibility
and responsiveness.
The key to the flexibility and responsiveness is Taiwan’ s entrepreneurial corporate
culture. Many computer firms started as family companies or small partnerships. The top
management has usually had an engineering background and, over the years, has been in-
volved in all key areas of the business from design to purchasing to manufacturing to dis-
tribution. The senior manager usually travels extensively, networking with customers,
suppliers, and competitors, as well as attending numerous professional and business con-
ferences in an effort to stay abreast of both technology and markets. Decision making has
been highly centralized in the senior manager, or a small team, with communication be-
tween executive and line management direct and by voice. Because of this broad experi-
ence, extensive networking, and centralized decision making, Taiwanese firms have been
able to respond quickly to both demand and supply opportunities as they arise.
The emphasis placed on an entrepreneurial culture in Taiwan’ s PC industry is illus-
trated by Acer’ s recently announced plan to break itself up into 21 public companies by
the twenty-first century in an effort to retain an entrepreneurial culture. Acer Chairman
Stan Shih made the move because he felt that it would motivate employees to work
harder by giving them a stake in the company. Quoting a familiar Chinese saying, he
said, ª I would rather be the head of the chicken than the tail of the cow.º  Acer plans to
list the units on local stock exchanges in the countries in which they operate, keeping a
minority stake for the parent company. This strategy is aimed at allowing the units to
raise adequate capital for their needs and operate with substantial independence while
maintaining some of the advantages of size (e.g., brand recognition, technology sharing)
through association with the parent company. It remains to be seen how this arrangement
will work in practice, but it is an interesting approach to encouraging rapid growth while
maintaining flexibility.
The presence or lack of entrepreneurial energy in a country is not a phenomenon that
has been investigated extensively or that is well understood. However, in Taiwan, the
government has supported small business with subsidies that are not available to compa-
nies above a certain size. This creates an incentive to keep companies small by spinning
off activities and creating new companies, thus reinforcing the entrepreneurial culture.
The prevalence of small firms in the computer industry has caused problems in achieving
economies of scale in production and R&D, but it has also encouraged firms to continu-
ally seek new product niches in which they can make a profit.
Flexible, Coordinated Technology Policy
Government policy has been aimed at complementing and supporting, rather than replac-
ing, the efforts of the private sector. There has also been an effective flow of information
between the public and private sectors. Information from the private sector has enabled
government to make policies that address the needs of industry, such as facilitating tech-
nology transfer and funding research through ITRI, ERSO, and III that the private sector
could not afford. Government institutions, such as MIC, have provided industry with in-
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formation on new technologies and market opportunities. Government has also provided
for the development of critical human resources needed by industry by emphasizing the
production of engineers and computer professionals, the training and certification of ex-
isting staff, and the recruitment of high-level, experienced overseas Taiwanese to help de-
velop its information industries.
Taiwan has also been able to achieve a relatively high level of cooperation among
government agencies with responsibility for computer policy. Unlike Japan and Korea,
which have become bogged down in recent years by bureaucratic infighting, Taiwan has
been able to coordinate the efforts of economic, scientific, communication, education,
and executive agencies. This is not to say that there is no competition or jealousy among
institutions. The calls by other agencies (and private companies) for the breakup or scal-
ing down of ITRI and III belie that notion. However, compared to many countries, Tai-
wan has been able to develop and implement a coordinated strategy for computers with-
out bureaucratic infighting.
Taiwan’ s government-sponsor ed institutions and private industry have been very
nimble in responding to changes in international markets and to the rapid pace of techno-
logical change in the computer industry. Institutions such as ITRI, ERSO, and III have so
far avoided getting bogged down in long-term, inflexible plans and projects. Instead they
have generally responded to the more immediate needs of industry and government.
Taiwan has also exhibited flexibility in its international orientation and links to
multinational corporations. Taiwan built its electronics industry, and then its PC industry,
on the basis of relationships with multinational corporations. The industry was export ori-
ented from the beginning, partly in response to government incentives, but also due to the
small size of the domestic market. Taiwan could not produce just for its domestic market
and develop a successful PC industry. The government supported the industry interna-
tionally by providing market intelligence, facilitating technology transfer from abroad,
and encouraging investment by foreign computer makers in Taiwan.
Future Challenges
In spite of its success, Taiwan’ s computer industry still faces serious challenges if it is to
maintain its pace of growth. Its products are known for low price, but price competition
in the industry and rising labor costs at home are putting a squeeze on profit margins. De-
pendence on Japanese companies for critical components puts Taiwanese companies in a
vulnerable position.
As Taiwan’ s companies grow larger, they are faced with the need for a more focused
approach to R&D and product management. Profit margins for computer hardware are
thin for companies that do not control critical technologies. Taiwan needs to continue to
improve its technological capabilities and develop strategies such as original design man-
ufacturing in order to stay competitive. Survival as an OEM can be precarious, as cus-
tomers can always look for cheaper suppliers. Taiwan’ s shift to a full-service OEM/ODM
producer has bolstered its position in the market. Eventually, more companies may decide
to follow Acer’ s lead in developing their own brand-name products for export. Creation
of brand-name awareness is expensive, but it allows companies to control their distribu-
tion channels and create demand from end users.
Taiwan is still far behind the industrialized countries, and even behind the other East
Asian newly industrialized economies, in its level and sophistication of computer use.
The entire economy would benefit from greater investment in computer use, which has
been shown in several studies to have a high rate of return at both the firm level and the
246 K. L. Kraemer et al.
national level (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1993; Kraemer & Dedrick, 1994; Lichtenberg, 1993).
Increased investment in computer use would also spur domestic demand for software and
services, which are often more profitable than hardware production. There is also tremen-
dous potential for the export of Chinese-language software throughout Asia, and an espe-
cially large market if trade relations are liberalized between Taiwan and the mainland. If
Taiwan’ s SMEs were to take to software production as well as they have to hardware,
Taiwan could become a leader in Asia’ s software industry, although the continued prob-
lem of piracy throughout Asia makes this difficult.
In spite of the problems it faces, Taiwan is probably Asia’ s best positioned country for
continued success in the computer industry. Its industry structure is well suited to the
global computer industry and shows great adaptability as illustrated by recent trends to-
ward diversification, full service OEM and consolidation. It is rapidly developing its tech-
nological capabilities to stay ahead of low-cost competitors in the region. And, it is already
in the process of globalizing its own production to lower costs and gain market access
through investments in China, Southeast Asia and North America. Taiwan’ s plans for NII
development, if carried through, should help maintain its competitive position as global
production chains and marketing channels are increasingly connected electronically.
Note
1. The exchange rate of NT$:US$ is about 25:1.
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